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Introduction
The EU’s Rule of Law Initiative is one of three 
EU regional projects in Central Asia,1 first set 
out in the EU’s Central Asia Strategy in 2007, 
as a flagship engagement aimed at linking 
political priorities to practical assistance in 
the  region. 2  The  Initiative  is  intended,  on 
the part of the EU and member states, “to 
support on-going modernisation of the legal 
sector,  as  part  of  a  more  comprehensive 
strategy to foster and consolidate stability, 
prosperity  and  respect  for  human  rights 
in  Central  Asian  countries”.3  Rule  of  Law 
is now being viewed as a key policy goal 
amongst international development actors. 
Economic  growth,  political  modernisation 
and the ability to attract foreign investment 
hinges, in part, on strengthening rule of law 
in transitional states.4 Since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the Central Asian countries 
of  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan  have 
developed legal systems that contain some 
1    The  other  two  major  initiatives  are  Water/
Environment and Education. 
2   Council of the European Union, The EU and 
Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, 20 
July 2007 (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/
en/Europa/Aussenpolitik/Regionalabkommen/
EU-CentralAsia-Strategy.pdf). 
3    “EU  Rule  of  Law  Initiative  in  Central Asia”, 
concept  paper  presented  at  EU-Central  Asia 
ministerial  Troika  in  Ashgabat,  Turkmenistan, 
9-10 April 2008.
4   Matthew Stephenson, “Rule of Law as a Goal 
of  Development  Policy”,  World  Bank,  (http://
go.worldbank.org/DZETJ85MD0). 
newly introduced elements of Western law, 
residual vestiges of the Soviet legal system 
and  elements  of  traditional  practices  and 
customs.5 These legal systems are heavily 
personalised  and  prone  to  patronage. 
The  presidents  of  each  state  hold  sway 
and the judiciary lacks independence with 
power residing in the office of the general 
prosecutor who is appointed by the president. 
Impartiality, transparency, trial by jury (with 
the  recent  exception  of  Kazakhstan)  and 
the guaranteed protection of citizens from 
arbitrary action by the state are all features 
absent in the legal system, along with public 
confidence.6 
The  EU  Rule  of  Law  Initiative  intends  to 
engage with Central Asian states on the issue 
of rule of law using a two-pronged approach, 
applying  high-level  political  dialogue  and 
specific  technical  programmes.  Although 
the initiative is still in its early stages, there 
are  issues  and  problems  concerning  the 
process  of  its  implementation  and  some 
normative limitations inherent in its approach. 
Currently,  the  focus  is  on  the  commercial 
and  trade  rewards  (for  both  the  EU  and 
Central Asian states) that transforming the 
legal and judicial systems can bring rather 
than the good governance and human rights 
benefits. It leaves the EU open to criticism 
5   Irina Morozova, “Legal systems and political 
regimes  in  post-socialist  Central  Asia”,  IIAS 
Newsletter, No. 34, July 2004 (http://www.iias.nl/
iiasn/july04/ls.pdf).
6   Kyrgyzstan is in the process of introducing trial 
by jury.  
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ISBN 978-92-9079-913-9that its role as a fully realised normative power is weakened in 
this instance. This Policy Brief analyses the development and 
implementation  of  the  EU’s  Rule  of  Law  Initiative  in  Central 
Asia, paying attention to the process and problems of political 
dialogue, the coordination of specific long-term projects through 
various agencies and the normative limitations of the approach. 
It recommends that the Initiative would benefit from a long-term 
commitment by EU member states to this issue in the region, 
which would be set out in a substantive, publicly agreed document 
punctuated with clearly stated benchmarks for development. The 
technical projects on the ground would also profit from greater 
transparency and coordination. 
Development of the Initiative
A commitment to developing a Rule of Law Initiative appeared 
in the EU’s Central Asia Strategy as a concrete policy goal to 
address specific priorities supporting Central Asian states’ efforts 
of legal and judicial reform. The Strategy stated that EU member 
states would allocate funds towards the Initiative, second judicial 
and administrative experts to Central Asian states, provide training 
opportunities,  support  the  transparent  implementation  of  legal 
reform, facilitate international exchange through the organisation 
and sponsoring of conferences and foster cooperation between 
the Central Asian states and the Council of Europe’s advisory 
body on constitutional and legal matters, the Venice Commission. 
In the Strategy’s joint progress report, published in June 2008, 
the Initiative remained in its developmental stages.7 The report 
indicated an initial concept paper had been agreed and shared 
with  the  Central  Asian  states  at  the  EU-Central  Asian  troika 
meeting in Ashgabat in Turkmenistan in April 2008.8 
The concept paper envisaged two kinds of action: an EU-Central 
Asia Rule of Law Platform and specific long-term projects. The 
key objective of the platform is to step up policy dialogue between 
the EU and Central Asian states on priority themes. Dialogue 
is foreseen to occur at three levels: the ministerial level, which 
is intended to discuss and review policy development of legal 
reforms and required training for each state’s legal professions; 
and technical meetings at regional and national levels on legal 
reform.  The  second  action,  specific  long-term  activities,  is 
intended  to  provide  Central Asian  countries  with  guidance  for 
their legal reform efforts. This will involve programmes provided 
by EU member states aimed at offering assistance and advisory 
services with regards to the development of the Central Asian 
states’  judicial  systems  and  legal  professions,  the  support  of 
professional legal reform and regional exchange programmes.9  In 
particular, projects will be implemented with regard to reinforcing 
the cooperation between constitutional courts, modernising the 
training of young lawyers and implementing the legal guarantees 
for the accused in court.10  
7   European Commission External Relations: Joint Progress Report by 
the  Council  and  the  European  Commission  to  the  European  Council 
on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy, 24 June 2008 
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/docs/progress_
report_0608_en.pdf).
8   “EU Rule of Law Initiative in Central Asia”, op. cit. 
9   “EU/Central Asia: New Rule of Law Initiative Targets Five Republics”, 
European Report, 1 December 2008. 
10   “EU-Central Asia cooperation to strengthen the Rule of Law”, Euroalert.
net, 2 December 2008 (http://euroalert.net/en/news.aspx?idn=8196).
Progress only began with the official launch of the Initiative at 
a  Ministerial  Conference  in  Brussels  on  the  27-28  November 
2008.  The Ministers of Justice of the EU and the Central Asian 
states released a joint communiqué welcoming the development 
of the initiative, emphasising the importance of exchange and 
expertise, expressing the will to strengthen cooperation on the 
basis of joint projects connected to legal and judicial reform and 
emphasising  the  necessity  of  basic  and  further  training  for  all 
legal and judicial professions as vital for strengthening rule of law 
in the region.11 One of the key outcomes of the conference was a 
commitment from the Central Asian states to permit discussions 
and assistance on the rule of law at a regional as well as bilateral 
level.  Agreement  was  also  reached  to  hold  two  conferences 
related to rule of law issues. The first, originally planned for June 
2009  in  Bishkek,  Kyrgyzstan  and  organised  by  Germany,  has 
now been postponed until September. The second conference, to 
be organised by France, is also planned for September 2009 in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan. A further major conference on rule of law 
is planned to be held in 2010 in Central Asia too. The Ministerial 
Conference in Brussels indicated that Germany and France were 
leading co-sponsors of this initiative, driving it forward on behalf 
of member states and the European Commission, with Germany 
acting as the senior partner. 
In what context?
Rule of law is the “rule of rights contrasted by the lack of checks 
and balances in the constitutional, legal and judicial framework”.12 
The Central Asian states are widely associated with authoritarian 
regimes  with  heavy  personalisation  of  political  office,  weak 
judicial independence, a poor record of good governance and 
a  low  commitment  to  international  standards  of  human  rights. 
Freedom House, for example, in its 2009 report, highlighted the 
Central Asians states as “consolidated authoritarian regimes”.13 
Therefore, a commitment on behalf of the EU to support reform 
of legal systems governed by a series of inalienable rights feeds 
not  only  into  improved  circumstances  within  which  to  conduct 
business and trade but also addresses the need for the protection 
of citizens from the arbitrary actions of the state. 
The Initiative is notable for not being entirely new. The EU member 
states and partner organisations (most markedly the OSCE) have 
been  operating  programmes  in  the  region  aimed  at  reforming 
judicial institutions and legal practices for some time. The premise 
of the new Initiative is to place these varying programmes under 
a single banner. From the EU’s perspective, the idea is to add 
value to and coordinate what already exists. While new financing 
for projects will emerge as part of the Initiative – mainly packaged 
within the work of the Venice Commission – the onus is just as 
much on coordinating existing programmes, namely those run by 
the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the Venice Commission 
and the European Commission. That these different programmes 
and activities are provided by various agencies has given the 
initiative a disjointed atmosphere. 
11   “Rule of Law – Cornerstone of Development”, Launch of the European 
Union’s Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia Ministerial Conference of 
European Union and Central Asian Countries Brussels, 27-28 November 
2008,  joint  communiqué  (http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/
shared/import/1127_conference_UE_Asie_centrale/EU-Central_Asia_
Conference%20_Joint_communique_rule_of_law_Asia_EN.pdf).
12   Gerald Staberock, “A Rule of Law Agenda for Central Asia”, Essex 
Human Rights Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 1.
13   Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, New York, 2009). 
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Above all, the initiative is aimed at establishing a dialogue on 
rule of law issues between Central Asian states, the European 
Commission, member states and other actors, e.g. NGOs. Political 
dialogue on issues such as reforming the legal systems of Central 
Asia, introducing greater transparency and combating corruption 
are  understandably  sensitive  subjects.  The  previous  tactic  of 
sanctions, as in the case of Uzbekistan after the Andijan events of 
2005, was perceived to have not been greatly successful. Instead 
the Initiative follows the German belief of undertaking unconditional 
dialogue with Central Asian states in an effort to foster reform in 
the region and ensure greater stability and security. Articulated 
as a new Ostpolitik, it represents a conciliatory and collaborative 
approach that entails a process of building trust and confidence 
between the EU and Central Asian governments to the extent that 
serious dialogue can take place on rule or law, good governance 
and human rights which under the policy of sanctions would be 
close to impossible.14 Central Asian states are able to benefit from 
the EU’s experience of tackling rule of law issues in other regions 
such as parts of former communist Europe and more recently 
Kosovo. That Turkmenistan is now willing to adjust its national 
laws to international standards, to draft a report on torture in the 
country and to sit down and discuss human rights with EU officials 
in Brussels suggests that a degree of qualitative progress is being 
made.15 However, through its unconditional engagement in the 
region, the EU is left open to criticism that it is legitimising regimes 
that often fail to meet international standards of human rights and 
democracy.
While the Initiative is aimed at offering a unified regional approach 
due to the five countries sharing similar problems with regards 
to rule of law, it also seeks to offer assistance in priority areas 
highlighted by the countries themselves. The idea is to make the 
initiative responsive to the particular needs of individual Central 
Asian states by handing them ownership of the Initiative. Different 
countries are progressing at different speeds on legal and judicial 
reform.  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan  are  further  advanced  in 
updating their legal systems than some of the other Central Asian 
countries. In Turkmenistan the priority is human capital reform – 
this includes legal training and the training of civil servants and 
elites. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the focus is 
on reform within the judicial courts. In Tajikistan the priority is on 
penal reform. 
Technical projects
Since  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  a  number  of  external 
actors  have  been  active  in  providing  technical  programmes 
related to the rule of law, legal reform and human rights issues in 
Central Asia. Prominent among them has been the OSCE, which 
has implemented a considerable policing reform programme  in 
Kyrgyzstan  among  other  human  dimension  activities,  such  as 
human rights, rule of law, good governance , penitentiary reform 
14   Gernot Erler, “Towards a new EU Ostpolitik? Russia, Eastern Europe 
and  Central Asia”,  lecture  given  by  the  Kyrgyzstan  Minister  of  State, 
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 7 February 2007 (http://www.
fes.de/aktuell/focus_europa/7/Docs/FES_DC_Rede_Erler_Ostpolitik.
pdf).
15    “Turkmenistan,  EU  Hold  Human  Rights Talks  in  Brussels”,  Radio 
Free  Europe/Radio  Liberty,  3  July  2009  (http://www.rferl.org/content/
Turkmenistan_EU_Hold_Human_Rights_Talks_In_Brussels/1768624.
html). 
and the promotion of free and fair elections.16 The UK and the 
Netherlands have been active too with the British running projects 
through the Office of International Development primarily aimed at 
good governance issues in support of its poverty reduction policy 
and the Dutch undertaking projects related to good governance, 
rule of law and democratisation through its Matra Programme. Civil 
society groups such as the Open Society Institute (OSI) currently 
have foundations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which 
all run law programmes. In Tajikistan for example the programme 
has been successful among other things in implementing general 
training projects for judges and facilitating the development of the 
local bar association. 
Two of the most prominent actors in the region have been the 
German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the Venice Commission. 
The programmes of the GTZ have been central to promoting and 
supporting rule of law issues prior to, and since, the development 
of the Initiative. GTZ is active in all five Central Asian countries. 
Funded by the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and 
Development, the GTZ has implemented programmes providing 
consultation  on  legislative  reform  with  a  focus  on  trade  and 
commercial law and the training of judges and judicial staff. In 
total GTZ has spent €9.2 million on rule of law activities in Central 
Asia over the last ten years.17  One of the most recent events 
sponsored by GTZ was a legal seminar held in Ashgabat to promote 
international legal standards among Turkmen lawyers.18 Projects 
have included creating a two-year curriculum for young judges 
in Kazakhstan to apply the law in the civil procedure court and a 
project to ensure the Supreme Court in Kazakhstan publishes all 
its decisions and legislation transparently. Kazakhstan represents 
a focal point of much activity. The projects of GTZ have supported 
the development of legislation especially in the fields of company 
law, the limited liability code and the civil code.
New  projects  being  developed  within  the  initiative  are  to  be 
packaged  and  implemented  through  the  existing  work  of  the 
Venice Commission. The German government has already made 
a voluntary contribution of €90,000 to the Venice Commission prior 
to the official release of €600,000 from the European Commission 
(expected later this year) towards the development of new rule 
of law projects in Central Asia. The Venice Commission, similar 
to the GTZ, has been operating in Central Asia for a number of 
years. By the end of the 1990s, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were 
awarded observer status with the Commission with Kyrgyzstan 
joining  as  a  full  member  in  2002.  Much  of  the  Commission’s 
work, therefore, has been in these two states and focused on 
cooperating with the main constitutional bodies in both states. This 
has involved offering legal opinions on constitutional reform and 
draft laws to the election code, law on ombudsman and judicial 
reform. However, their work in Kyrgyzstan was affected by the 
chaotic constitutional aftermath of the ‘tulip revolution’, while in 
Kazakhstan cooperation was limited to seminars and conferences 
on these issues. 
Since being invited by the European Commission to establish 
projects and work with the other three Central Asian states as part 
of the Rule of Law Initiative, the Venice Commission has been 
16    OSCE,  “Police  Assistance  Programmes  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic” 
(http://www.osce.org/documents/cib/2006/10/21688_en.pdf). 
17    This  figure  was  obtained  from  several  interview  sources  and  is 
believed to be a rough estimate. 
18    “Exchanging  legal  experience”,  18  June  2006  (http://www.
turkmenistan.gov.tm/_en/?idr=5&id=090618bn).
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Commission’s activities vary from country to country and reflect 
the political realities of dealing with issues related to rule of law 
in some Central Asian states. These have included fact-finding 
missions  to  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan,  on-going  discussions 
with the Turkmen embassy in Brussels, a Venice Commission 
delegation attending a conference on judicial reform in Kazakhstan 
and a range of activities in Kyrgyzstan including legal opinions 
and the organisation of a number of conferences on the principles 
of the rule of law and the separation of powers. 
Problems of process and normative 
limitations 
The combined programmes of the GTZ, the Venice Commission, 
the European Commission, various EU member states and other 
agencies denote a wide sense of activity on rule of law issues. 
However,  significant  questions  remain  regarding  the  impact, 
purpose  and  long-term  success  of  such  programmes  and  the 
initiative overall. While the increased emphasis on rule of law 
through the development of the Initiative is welcome from a good 
governance perspective, there are problems and limitations to 
this approach, which fall broadly into two categories: problems of 
process and normative limitations. 
The Initiative is organised by way of bringing together various 
pre-existing programmes and the formation of new programmes 
through selected agencies (the Venice Commission and GTZ). 
The problem arising from this construction is that the Initiative 
lacks overall clarity and feels disjointed. Rather than being a well 
thought-out and coordinated set of programmes linked to specific 
priorities  (from  both  the  EU  and  Central  Asian  governments’ 
perspective)  aimed  at  reforming  highly  personalised  and 
non-rationalised  legal  systems,  it  is  a  number  of  fragmented 
programmes with coordination and linkage between them distinctly 
lacking.  The  focus  currently  remains  on  the  political  dialogue 
platform, which resembles a political talking shop undermining 
the EU’s commitment to back up strategic priorities with practical 
action. While getting Central Asian leaders to engage on such 
issues is an important step forward, the initiative would benefit 
from  a  more  joined-up,  results-driven  approach.  The  concept 
paper and the joint communiqué, while providing a basis for an 
initiative, are not adequate for a fully realised effort to reform the 
legal sphere in the region. Neither document provides a way to 
measure the progress of the Initiative against stated goals. The 
lack of a joined-up approach has resulted in a non-transparent 
process where the agencies involved in delivering programmes 
on the ground have found it difficult to know and understand what 
the other is doing. 
The EU has prided itself on being a normative actor. Indeed the 
added  value  it  offers  Central Asia  over  other  strategic  actors 
(namely Russia and China) is a commitment to fostering, supporting 
and promoting rule of law, good governance and human rights. 
Yet, as has been suggested elsewhere, the EU’s actions as a 
normative power can be in contradiction to its economic, defence 
and security interests. 19 The Rule of Law Initiative adds to the 
sense of contradiction. At the political level the EU may highlight 
legal and judicial reform as the basis on which economic stability 
can be achieved for Central Asian states in order to build trust 
and avert suspicion. However, at the same time, the emphasis on 
19    Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, pp. 235-58. 
commercial and trade law reform and building a transparent legal 
framework for the development of a market economy suggests 
there is more interest in trade benefits and energy security than 
in the human rights and good governance benefits of rule of law 
reform. Arguably these economic-legal norms form an important 
part of the EU’s normative function and make it easier for the EU 
to engage with Central Asia. Furthermore, developments in the 
Human Rights Dialogue (see below) do balance out the emphasis 
on economic-legal norms. Furthermore, the dialogue and practical 
programmes associated with the initiative are not entirely centred 
on the commercial side. A great deal of work has been done in 
recent years by the GTZ on the Civil Code in Kazakhstan, for 
instance. However, even in this sphere there are limitations. Under 
the Kazakh Civil Code, while there are guarantees of citizens’ 
rights and protection from the state, there is no guarantee of its 
practical effectiveness. 
The limitations of the Initiative are also emphasised by the overall 
degree of ownership given to the Central Asian states themselves. 
Allowing the countries to recognise their own priorities within the 
dialogue and at the practical level, while sensible in encouraging 
their participation, ensures that they are able to set the rules of 
the  game.  It  means  programmes  and  discussions  on  serious 
issues of political transparency, corruption and the blatant abuse 
of international standards of human rights in the region will rarely 
be touched upon, if at all. Therefore, questions arise regarding 
the  genuine  impact  of  a  Rule  of  Law  Initiative  in  the  region. 
Practitioners involved in programmes running on the ground in 
Central Asia have pointed to the success of the reform of the 
Civil  Code  and  commercial  and  trade  law  in  Kazakhstan  and 
the influence of affiliated European agencies in helping shape 
constitutional reform in Kyrgyzstan. But what genuine impact can 
such programmes have on the highly personalised legal systems 
that revolve around the political will of the president (especially 
in  the  cases  of  Turkmenistan,  Uzbekistan  and  Kazakhstan)? 
Running seminar programmes for lawyers on legal techniques is 
a serious effort at tackling a very sensitive issue at the ground 
level.  However,  will  legal  professionals  be  able  to  apply  new 
techniques  they  have  learnt  within  legal  systems  that  do  not 
support transparent, rational and independent action?
Gradual progress, however, is observable in particular with regards 
to rule of law issues in connection with the related (but officially 
separate) human rights dialogue on-going between the EU and 
Kazakhstan. The first annual seminar between Kazakh and EU 
academic and practitioning lawyers and NGO personalities took 
place  in Almaty  at  the  end  of  June  2009.  The  event  brought 
together about 50 Kazakh and 20 mainly independent EU legal 
experts, who debated in detail aspects of judicial and penal reform. 
The  seminar  produced  13  pages  of  agreed  recommendations 
addressed to the Kazakh authorities. The European Commission 
Head of Delegation concluded the seminar in pointing out that these 
recommendations would be taken as input into the official human 
rights dialogue, which includes annual sessions at senior official 
level. In one sense, the event in Almaty illustrates the positive 
results that can emerge on these issues in authoritarian states 
However, there is no guarantee that any of the recommendations 
will be taken up by the Kazakh government. The fact that no 
member of the government was present at the seminar and that 
the Kazakh authorities have a record of undertaking the least 
amount  of  reform  that  might  be  construed  as  acceptable  by 
external actors does suggest progress will not be easy. 
The impact of the Rule of Law Initiative is limited in its effectiveness, 
certainly in the short- to mid- term. This is evidenced by recent 
4  EUCAM Policy Brief No. 9events  in  Uzbekistan  which  illustrate  that  the  presidency  of 
Islam Karimov aims at making certain that the judiciary and legal 
system is obedient to his political preferences. A new law passed 
in December 2008 amended the law on the bar and required all 
lawyers in Uzbekistan to re-qualify for their licence to practice. This 
suggests that the government is “trying to bring the bar to heel”.20 
Consequently, this provided the government with an opportunity to 
revoke the licenses of two prominent lawyers who had defended 
and protected the rights of journalists and human rights activists 
who  were  critical  of  the  authorities.21  Furthermore,  the  latest 
Freedom  House  report  on  Kyrgyzstan  suggests  that  external 
actors’ reform efforts of the judicial system in the country have been 
unsuccessful partly due to a lack of will from judges and politicians. 
President Bakiyev remains able to appoint judges, with the judicial 
system often used to persecute the political opposition.22 Such 
developments  illustrate  that  despite  engagement  in  the  region 
judicial and legal reform is going to be very difficult to achieve. 
Recommendations 
The EU should persist with the Rule of Law Initiative and  •	
embed it into external relations policy as a long-term policy 
objective. Reform of Central Asian legal systems is not going 
to happen in the medium term. While reform affecting trade 
and commercial opportunities might come in the short-term 
and reap economic benefits for the region and the EU, reform 
of civil law, tackling corruption and supporting the development 
of transparent, fair and rational judicial systems can only be 
achieved by making a long-term commitment.
A  long-term  commitment  should  be  marked  by  a  clear,  •	
transparent  and  more  elaborate  public  document  setting 
out the EU’s priorities, strategies and goals regarding rule 
of law in Central Asia over the long-term (20-30 years). This 
should not focus so much on Central Asian states’ priorities 
but act as a commitment by the EU to its normative status 
regarding the development of good governance in the region. 
The current concept paper and joint communiqué provide a 
basis for a long-term initiative but are not substantive enough. 
A document publicly agreed by all member states regarding 
their commitment to supporting rule of law in the region is 
required for the long-term success of the Initiative. 
The  document  would  benefit  from  a  series  of  clear  •	
benchmarks and measures against which the Central Asian 
states’ progress on rule of law can be measured. Currently, 
there is no way of measuring the success of the Initiative. As 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) suggested in a 2008 report on 
the EU’s Central Asia strategy, “benchmarking, consultations, 
and transparency in implementation are of utmost importance 
in  order  for  the  strategy  to  realise  its  full  potential  impact 
on human rights”.23 Similar to the HRW report, a series of 
20    Omar  Sharifov,  “Uzbekistan:  Nado  by  pochistit’  v  advokatskikh 
ryadakh…”,  Ferghana.ru,  14  April  2009  (http://www.ferghana.ru/article.
php?id=6132ferghana.ru/04/14/09).
21    A.  Volosevich,  “Samye  izveyestnye  advokaty  Uzbekistana  budut 
lisheny litsenzii za profneprigodnost”, Ferghana.ru, 18 May 2005 (http://
www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6172).
22   Erica Marat, “Kyrgyzstan 2009 Country Report”, Nations in Transit 
2009, Freedom House, New York, 2009.
23   Human Rights Watch, Benchmarks, Consultations and Transparency: 
benchmarks can be set for each Central Asian country related 
to reforming the courts, guaranteeing the independence of the 
judiciary and reforming the legal system to ensure that the law 
protects citizens from the state. 
While the political dialogue platform of the initiative has made  •	
significant inroads in engaging Central Asian leadership with 
these sensitive issues, a greater emphasis should be placed 
on the specific long-term technical projects at the ground level. 
Political dialogue only serves to legitimise the authoritarian 
leaderships and weakens the EU’s claim to be a fully realised 
normative  power.  While  political  dialogue  is  necessary  for 
the success of technical projects – more financing and effort 
should go into developing projects through both the Venice 
Commission, the GTZ and other agencies. In this spirit greater 
effort should be made to bring other actors into the process. 
The Initiative would benefit from the experience and ideas of 
civil society groups (regional and international), parliaments 
and judicial actors as opposed to the current emphasis on 
high-level political elites. 
Consequently, the whole Initiative would benefit from a far  •	
more  effective  joined-up  approach  between  the  different 
agencies  involved  in  delivering  training  programmes, 
seminars and technical exchange in the region. This could be 
led by the EU where each agency can share information and 
experience and work far more cohesively in making sure the 
Initiative achieves its full potential. 
Conclusion 
The  EU’s  Rule  of  Law  Initiative  remains  at  a  nascent  stage. 
Reforming the legal sphere in Central Asia is important from a 
commercial,  good  governance  and  regional  and  international 
stability perspective. Currently, the initiative at both the political 
and project level suggests a greater emphasis on the commercial 
benefits of legal reform. This emphasis leaves the EU open to 
criticism  that  it  is  prioritising  economic-legal  norms  over  other 
normative functions. The added value that the EU possesses over 
other involved actors in the region is its commitment to promoting 
democracy, rule of law, adherence to international standards of 
human rights and good governance. Greater focus in the Initiative 
should, therefore, be placed on the civic benefits of rule of law 
reform, penal reform, trial by jury and greater independence and 
transparency of courts (although progress is being made in these 
areas). For the Rule of Law Initiative to be effective, the EU and 
partner agencies need to make a serious long-term commitment 
to this issue. The Central Asian states possess both traditional 
and Soviet legacies within their legal systems, which make them 
susceptible  to  personalism,  patronage  and  corruption.  Such 
tendencies can be overturned, but it will take a generation and a 
serious, well-planned commitment from the EU marked by clearly 
stated  benchmarks,  a  substantive  publicly  agreed  document, 
and greater transparency and coordination among the technical 
programmes on the ground. 
Making the EU Central Asia Strategy an Effective Tool for Human Rights 
Improvements,  7  April  2008  (http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/04/07/
benchmarks-consultations-and-transparency). 
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About EUCAM
The  Fundación  para  las  Relaciones  Internacionales  y  el  Diálogo  Exterior 
(FRIDE), Spain, in co-operation with the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS),  Belgium,  has  launched  a  joint  project  entitled  “EU  Central Asia 
Monitoring (EUCAM)”. The (EUCAM) initiative is an 18-month research and 
awareness-raising exercise supported by several EU member states and civil 
society organisations which aims: 
- to raise the profile of the EU-Central Asia Strategy; 
- to strengthen debate about the EU-Central Asia relationship and the role of 
the Strategy in that relationship; 
- to enhance accountability through the provision of high quality information 
and analysis; 
-  to  promote  mutual  understanding  by  deepening  the  knowledge  within 
European and Central Asian societies about EU policy in the region; and 
- to develop ‘critical’ capacity within the EU and Central Asia through the 
establishment of a network that links communities concerned with the role of 
the EU in Central Asia.
EUCAM focuses on four priority areas in order to find a mix between the broad 
political ambitions of the Strategy and the narrower practical priorities of EU 
institutions and member state assistance programmes:
•  Democracy and Human Rights 
•  Security and Stability 
•  Energy and Natural Resources 
•  Education and Social Relations 
EUCAM will produce the following series of publications:
 - A bi-monthly newsletter on EU-Central Asia relations will be produced and 
distributed broadly by means of an email list server using the CEPS and FRIDE 
networks. The newsletter contains the latest documents on EU-Central Asia 
relations, up-to-date information on the EU’s progress in implementing the 
Strategy and developments in Central Asian countries.
  -  Policy  briefs  will  be  written  by  permanent  and  ad  hoc  Working  Group 
members. The majority of the papers examine issues related to the four core 
themes  identified  above,  with  other  papers  commissioned  in  response  to 
emerging areas beyond the main themes.
 - Commentaries on the evolving partnership between the EU and the states 
of Central Asia will be commissioned reflecting specific developments in the 
EU-Central Asian relationship. 
  - A  final  monitoring  report  of  the  EUCAM  Expert  Working  Group  will  be 
produced by the project rapporteurs. 
This  monitoring  exercise  is  implemented  by  an  Expert  Working  Group, 
established by FRIDE and CEPS. The group consists of experts from the 
Central Asian states and the members countries of the EU. In addition to 
expert  meetings,  several  public  seminars  will  be  organised  for  a  broad 
audience including EU representatives, national officials and legislators, the 
local civil society community, media and other stakeholders. 
EUCAM  is  sponsored  by  the  Open  Society  Institute  (OSI)  and  the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project is also supported 
by the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.
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